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There is significant controversy about the use of experts in childrelated disputes in family and child protection proceedings in
Canada. The 2015 Lang Review of the Motherisk Laboratory at
Toronto’s Hospital for Sick Children concluded that experts retained
by child protection agencies were introducing unreliable expert
testimony about parental drug and alcohol use. The recent decision
of Ontario Court of Appeal in M. v. F. suggested that evidence from
a party-retained expert critiquing the opinion of a court-appointed
psychologist is “rarely” helpful or admissible. This paper addresses
these and related controversies about the use of experts in childrelated cases. It reviews recent developments in the law governing
the admissibility of expert evidence, with a particular focus on the
2015 Supreme Court decision in White Burgess, and the role of the
judge as a “gatekeeper,” responsible for excluding biased or
unreliable expert testimony. The paper explores the unique role
played by court-appointed experts in child-related disputes. It is
argued that there should be a continued role for experts retained by
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one parent to critique a report prepared by a court-appointed expert
in a child-related case; nonetheless there is an obligation for partyretained experts to provide unbiased and reliable evidence, and
avoid being “hired guns.” This critique role may be especially
important when the state has been involved in the court process,
either as a party in a child protection proceeding or by arranging
for a particular court-appointed professional to undertake an
assessment. It is also argued that there is a strong Charter based
argument that indigent parents in child protection proceedings may
be entitled to a court order for funding to retain their own experts to
testify to counter evidence put forward by experts funded by the
government.
THE IMPORTANCE AND LIMITATIONS OF EXPERTS IN
CHILD-RELATED CASES
Since the 1970’s there has been significant use in Canada of courtappointed experts, usually social workers or psychologists, to
prepare reports for assistance in the resolution of family and child
welfare disputes.1 While these reports are frequently important for
both settlement and judicial decision-making, there is continuing
debate about when these reports should be ordered, what should be
the qualifications, 2 training, and supervision of the experts who
1

See e.g., Nicholas Bala, “Assessments for Post-Separation Parenting
Disputes in Canada” (2004), 42 Fam Ct Rev 485 [Bala, Assessments].

2

In one disturbing Ontario situation, a man with some psychological
education overstated his qualifications and was appointed by family courts
in the Oshawa area to prepare reports that resulted in individuals losing
custody of their children. Although he was eventually disciplined by the
College of Psychologists of Ontario, it is unclear what happened to the
cases where he testified: see Christie Blatchford, “Man accused of posing
as psychologist in child-custody disputes,” Globe and Mail (27 January
2010), online: <wwwtheglobeandmail.com>; Niamh Scallan “Whitby
therapist Gregory Carter acquitted of fraud charges,” Toronto Star (10

Addressing Controversies About Experts in Disputes Over Children

73

prepare them,3 who should pay for them, and how much weight the
evidence of these court-appointed experts should receive. There has
also been recent controversy over the role of the party-retained
experts in child-related cases. The Lang Review4 of the Motherisk
Laboratory at Toronto’s Hospital for Sick Children concluded that
experts retained by child protection agencies were introducing
unreliable expert testimony about parental drug and alcohol use in
child welfare proceedings. In another development, the 2015
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in M. v. F.5 suggested that
evidence from a party-retained expert critiquing the opinion of a
court-appointed psychologist is “rarely” helpful or admissible.6
This paper addresses these and related controversies about the
use of experts in family and child welfare cases involving children
February 2012), online: <www.thestar.com>; and College of Psychologists
of Ontario, “Discipline Proceedings” (2012) 3:3 The E-bulletin 1, online: <
http://www.cpo.on.ca/Concerns_and_Complaints.aspx>.
3

Concerns have, for example, been raised about whether all assessors
appreciate issues related to spousal violence and abuse; see Shahnaz
Rahman & Laura Track, Troubling Assessments: Custody and Access
Reports and Their Equality Implications for BC Women (Vancouver: West
Coast Leaf, 2012).

4

Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Motherisk Hair
Analysis Independent Review, by The Honourable Susan Lang (Ontario:
Ministry
of
the
Attorney
General,
2015),
online:
<www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca> [Lang Review]. In Quebec, a
hospital-based pediatrician who did work for child protection agencies and
was under investigation for making unfounded claims of child abuse
against a number of families recently committed suicide: Aaron Derfel,
“Montreal child-abuse expert commits suicide ‘under intense social
pressure’ amid lengthy investigation,” Postmedia News (6 December
2016), online: <www.nationalpost.com>.

5

2015 ONCA 277, 58 RFL (7th) 1.

6

Ibid at paras 41, 34.
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and parents. We begin by reviewing the law governing the
admissibility of expert evidence, with a particular focus on the 2015
Supreme Court decision in White Burgess7 and concerns relating to
the admissibility, reliability, and impartiality of expert evidence. We
then consider the unique role played by court-appointed experts in
child-related disputes, and explore the controversy about when
courts should order these reports. Next we discuss the application in
child-related cases of the “cost-benefit” analysis established by the
Supreme Court for the admissibility of expert evidence proffered by
party-retained professionals, an approach that requires consideration
of the reliability and lack of bias of the expert, as well taking
account of concerns about fairness and the efficiency of the trial
process; we argue that when dealing with child-related cases, the
cost-benefit analysis may require a different balancing of factors
than in the context of other civil or criminal cases. We then consider
the implications of the Lang Review, arguing that the Charter of
Rights s.7 requires that in a child protection proceeding the court
may order that indigent parents receive state funding to retain their
own experts to testify to counter evidence put forward by experts
funded by the government. We conclude the paper by offering
suggestions for addressing the challenges for the appropriate use of
expert evidence in child-related disputes, and advocating for
increased government resources to provide this vitally important
type of evidence.
Expert evidence often has a central role in the appropriate and
efficient resolution of child-related disputes, though courts need to
play a “gate-keeper” role with respect to the ordering of assessments
and admission of expert testimony. On the facts of M. v. F., there
were legitimate concerns in that case about the admissibility of
testimony of the party-retained “critique expert.” However, in our
7

White Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott and Haliburton, 2015 SCC 23,
[2015] 2 SCR 182 [White Burgess].
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view the obiter comments in M. v. F. about restricting the
admissibility of evidence from party-retained experts should not be
broadly interpreted. We argue that there should continue to be a role
for experts retained by one parent, to review or critique a report
prepared by a court-appointed or state-retained expert in a childrelated case, though counsel, judges, and potential expert witnesses
need to be aware of the obligation for party-retained experts to
provide unbiased and reliable evidence, and avoid being “hired
guns.” This critique role may be especially important when the state
has been involved in the court process, either as a party in a child
protection proceeding or by arranging for a particular courtappointed professional to undertake an assessment. There is also a
need for party-retained experts to be clear about their role and
ethical obligations; at present, there are no widely accepted
standards for mental health professionals undertaking a forensic
review of the work of another professional in the context of childrelated disputes, and appropriate guidelines should be developed by
professional organizations.
Since much of the recent controversy about the role of experts in
child-related cases has been in Ontario, we focus on the legislation
and jurisprudence in that province, though much of the discussion is
relevant to other parts of Canada, and we draw upon case law from
other provinces and territories as well. Indeed, there are
controversies about use of experts in family and child welfare cases
throughout the world, and this paper contributes to the on-going
international debate about whether, when, and how to make use of
expert evidence in these most important cases.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BEING AN “EXPERT”:
RELIABILITY AND BIAS CONCERNS
In this part of the paper we review the principles of the law
governing the admissibility of expert evidence, with particular focus
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on the issues that most commonly arise in connection with experts in
child-related cases: impartiality, qualifications, participant experts,
and reliability.
Generally, witnesses can only testify about what they did,
observed, or heard.8 Witnesses who are qualified as “experts” may
testify about their “opinions,” including the state of knowledge in
their field, and quote from texts they consider “authoritative.” As the
responsibility of drawing inferences or conclusions is generally the
responsibility of the trier of fact, in order to be accepted as an expert
witness and express an opinion, a person must “possess special
knowledge and experience going beyond that of the trier of fact.” 9
Experts may relate their knowledge of the field to the specific case
before the court and express opinions about the issues before the
court, though an expert cannot testify that a particular witness is
credible (or not), as this would violate the rule against “oath
helping.”10 The Supreme Court held in R. v. Mohan11 that the closer
an expert witness comes to expressing an opinion about the
“ultimate issue” in a case, the more judicial scrutiny there should

8

There is scope for lay witnesses to express “lay opinion” about matters
such as the age or sobriety of a person whom they observed: Gratt v R,
[1980] 2 SCR 819, 144 DLR (3d) 267. “Lay opinion” is commonly
admitted in child-related cases, both from professionals—such as child
protection workers—and relatives of parents, about such issues as whether
parents are being affectionate with their children or not. This issue of lay
opinion evidence from child protection workers is discussed in later
sections of this paper.

9

R v Marquard, [1993] 4 SCR 223, 108 DLR (4th) 47 [Marquard].

10

See R v Béland, [1987] 2 SCR 398, 43 DLR (4th) 641, and Whitfield v
Whitfield, 2016 ONCA 581.

11

R v Mohan, [1994] 2 SCR 9, 114 DLR (4th) 243 [Mohan].
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be concerning the admissibility of this evidence. 12 However, in
child-related proceedings, it is common for professionals, especially
court-appointed experts, to express their opinion about the ultimate
issue: the best interests of the child.13
JUDGES AS “GATEKEEPERS”: THE ADMISSIBILITY
THRESHOLD AND THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
In its 1994 decision in R. v. Mohan,14 the Supreme Court of Canada
held that judges must be “gatekeepers” for the admission of “expert
testimony.” More recently, Cromwell J. in the 2015 Supreme Court
decision White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton
observed that since 1994, the “unmistakeable overall trend of the
jurisprudence … has been to tighten the admissibility requirements
and to enhance the judge’s gatekeeping role.”15 While White
Burgess is broadly consistent with Mohan, it refined and clarified
the test for the admissibility of expert evidence, specifically the need
to establish the reliability and impartiality of an expert’s testimony.
12

Ibid at para 28 [emphasis added]: “expert evidence which advances a novel
scientific theory or technique is subjected to special scrutiny to determine
whether it meets a basic threshold of reliability and whether it is essential in
the sense that the trier of fact will be unable to come to a satisfactory
conclusion without the assistance of the expert. The closer the evidence
approaches an opinion on an ultimate issue, the stricter the application of
this principle.”

13

See e.g., M v F, supra note 5; CLB v JAB, 2016 SKCA 101, [2016] SJ 430.
For statutory provisions establishing the centrality of the “best interests of
the child,” see e.g Ontario, Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C-12,
s 24 (parenting disputes); and Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c
C-11, s 38(3) (child protection).

14

Mohan, supra note 11.

15

White Burgess, supra note 7 at para 20.
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Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
expressed concerns regarding the “dangers” of the admission of
expert evidence, including that it may result in a trial becoming a
“contest of experts,” with expert evidence potentially distracting the
trier of fact rather than assisting.16 The Court observed that the trial
process must not become an “attornment to the opinion of the
expert,” a possibility “exacerbated by the fact that expert evidence is
often resistant to effective cross-examination by counsel who are not
experts in that field.”17 The Court has also expressed concerns
regarding expert evidence prolonging the trial process and leading to
an inordinate expenditure of court time and expense for the parties.18
Issues of unfairness and of lack of resources to properly challenge an
expert retained by a government agency may be especially critical
when a litigant has very limited resources, as is often the case in
child protection proceedings.
The Supreme Court has also recognized the need for courts to
scrutinize the underlying science or body of knowledge that an
expert relies upon. Experts may overstate the reliability of their tests
and opinions, and there is risk of the admission of testimony based
on “junk science.”19 If the expert evidence is based upon a “novel”
or “contested science,” or science used for a novel purpose, the

16

Mohan, supra note 11 at 24. Professor Rollie Thompson argues that the
Supreme Court has displayed “deep skepticism, even suspicion” about the
value of expert testimony based on social science research in the
criminal trial process: DA Rollie Thompson, “Are There Any Rules of
Evidence in Family Law?” (2003), 21 Can Fam L Q 245 at 276.

17

R v DD, 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 SCR 275 at para 55.

18

Mohan, supra note 11; Supra note 17 at para 56.

19

R v J-LJ, 2000 SCC 51, [2000] 2 SCR 600 at para 25.
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reliability of the underlying science for that purpose should be
sufficiently proven before the evidence is admitted.20
It is worth emphasizing that the trial judge’s role as a
“gatekeeper” arises even if opposing counsel does not object to the
admission of the expert testimony, and arises in judge alone trials as
well as jury trials.21 In Mohan, Sopinka J. held that the party
seeking to call an expert must establish that four “threshold” criteria
of admissibility have been satisfied:22
Relevance;23
Necessity in assisting the trier of fact; that is providing
information likely outside the knowledge and experience of
the jury or judge; Sopinka J. stated that the word “helpful
sets too low a standard,” but he also said he “would not
judge necessity by too high a standard;” 24
A properly qualified expert; and

20

Ibid at paras 33, 35–36, and 47; see also R v Trochym, 2007 SCC 6, [2007]
1 SCR 239 at para 27.

21

R v Sekhon, 2014 SCC 15, [2014] 1 SCR 272 at para 46, per Moldaver J.
writing for the majority of the Supreme Court. Despite ruling the trial judge
erred in admitting the expert testimony, the Court upheld the conviction as
there was other “overwhelming” evidence of guilt.

22

R v Mohan, supra note 11, at paras 17–21.

23

White Burgess, supra note 7, at para 23. The concept of “relevance” was
explained in R v Shafia, 2016 ONCA 812, at para 227, by Watt JA: “The
expert opinion evidence must have a tendency, as a matter of human
experience and logic, to make the existence or non-existence of a fact in
issue more or less likely than it would be without the evidence.”

24

R v Mohan, supra note 11, at para 26.
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The absence of any exclusionary rule that would preclude
the admission of the expert evidence.25
The Court also stated that a "basic threshold of reliability" for
expert evidence must be established before the admissibility of the
evidence can be considered. The accused in Mohan was a pediatrician
charged with sexually assaulting four adolescent female patients
during medical examinations. The accused wanted to call a
psychiatrist with expertise in treating sexual offenders as a witness
to testify that the accused did not fit within the “limited and unusual
group” of physicians who would commit such offences. The
psychiatrist was prepared to testify that, in his opinion, the accused,
as a medical doctor, did not have the “extra abnormal, extra
component for the abnormality” that he would have had to possess
to abuse these adolescents, since he would have been violating “the
very strict professional norms against sexual involvement with
patients.”26 The trial judge ruled that the psychiatrist could not testify
before the jury. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, as the
proposed evidence was regarded as mere “personal opinion” and not
sufficiently “reliable” or grounded in research.27
In addition to the four criteria and reliability, Mohan established
that judges have a residual responsibility to undertake a “cost-benefit”
analysis of admissibility, and can exercise residual discretion to
exclude otherwise admissible expert evidence if its prejudicial effect
outweighs its probative value.28 This includes consideration of
25

One of the most common exclusionary rules that may preclude the use of
expert evidence is the rule against “oath helping,” which precludes an
expert from directly testifying about the credibility of another witness.

26

Mohan, supra note 11, at para. 8.

27

Ibid at para. 49.

28

Ibid at para 21; White Burgess, supra note 7 at para 19.
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prejudice to a fair trial, the costs imposed on the parties and court by
admitting such evidence, and potential costs for the rebuttal of the
expert evidence.
In White Burgess,29 Cromwell J., writing for a unanimous Court,
reviewed and synthesized the law governing admission of expert
evidence, and largely adopted the two-step approach to Mohan put
forward by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Abbey.30 Justice
Cromwell wrote:
At the first step, the proponent of the evidence must
establish the threshold requirements of admissibility.
These are the four Mohan factors (relevance,
necessity, absence of an exclusionary rule and a
properly qualified expert) and in addition, in the case
of an opinion based on novel or contested science or
science used for a novel purpose, the reliability of the
underlying science for that purpose . . . Evidence that
does not meet these threshold requirements should be
excluded. . . . At the second discretionary gatekeeping
step, the judge balances the potential risks and
benefits of admitting the evidence in order to decide
whether the potential benefits justify the risks. . . .
Doherty J.A. summed it up well in Abbey, stating that
the “trial judge must decide whether expert evidence
that meets the preconditions to admissibility is
sufficiently beneficial to the trial process to warrant
its admission despite the potential harm to the trial
process that may flow from the admission of the
29

White Burgess, supra note 7.

30

R v Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624, 97 OR (3d) 330 [Abbey], leave to appeal
refused Warren Nigel Abbey v Her Majesty the Queen, 2010 CanLii 37826
(SCC), [2010] SCCA No 125.

82

Canadian Journal of Family Law [Vol. 30(1), 2017]

expert evidence.”31
Trial judges must determine whether the four threshold
conditions of admissibility are satisfied. If they are, the judge must
also be satisfied that the evidence meets a threshold of “reliability”
and then undertake a discretionary cost-benefit analysis. If the
evidence is admitted, the trier of fact must ultimately determine what
weight to give it. Thus, issues of reliability and bias may be
considered at each stage.
Despite the cautious stance of the Supreme Court in Mohan and
subsequent cases towards expert evidence, a theme of White Burgess
is that trial courts also have a discretionary role and must undertake
a “cost-benefit analysis” for the admissibility of expert evidence. In
White Burgess, the Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge had been
too strict in applying this analysis and had erred in excluding the
testimony of an expert’s statement on the grounds of possible bias
based on an economic relationship to a party to the litigation. When
dealing with child-related cases, the cost-benefit analysis may
require a different balancing of factors than in the context of other
civil or criminal cases; child-related cases never involve a jury and
always require judges to make decisions about the future of a child
who is not a party to the proceedings; thus, the costs of admission of
expert evidence may be lower and the benefits greater. However,
even in child-related cases, there is reason for caution in the
admission of expert evidence and judicial scrutiny of its reliability.
QUALIFICATION AS AN EXPERT WITNESS
A party putting forward a person as an “expert” has the onus of
establishing the area of that person’s expertise, and further, that it is
31

White Burgess supra note 7 at paras 23–24. Citations within quotation
omitted.
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an appropriate area for introduction of expert evidence.32 Unless the
opposing party consents to introduction of the expert evidence, there
should be a voir dire to determine the qualifications and nature of
expertise of the proposed witness.
Most commonly the voir dire will focus on the first issue, the
qualifications and expertise of the particular expert.”33 The expertise
of the witness is typically established by providing the curriculum
vitae, and indicating whether the person has been accepted in other
similar cases as an expert (which is not determinative, but helpful).
The expertise may be acquired through education or experience, or a
combination of the two. It is often helpful to establish qualifications
within the field of expertise as well, for example by having a record
of being a presenter at professional education programs or
conducting peer-reviewed research. For some child-related issues,
such as a child welfare agency staff person expressing an opinion
about the adoptability of a child, significant professional experience
working in the field may be sufficient to allow a witness to provide
an opinion.34 Other matters, particularly related to psychological
testing or making a mental health diagnosis, clearly require formal
qualifications and professional accreditation before a person can be
qualified to express an opinion.35

32

White Burgess, supra note 7; Mohan, supra note 11.

33

See Rollie Thompson, “The Ten Evidence ‘Rules’ that Every Family Law
Lawyer Needs to Know” (2016), 35 Can Fam LQ 285 at 289.

34

See e.g., Children & Family Services for York Region v W(T), 2004
CarswellOnt 2430, [2004] OJ 2541.

35

See e.g., Children's Aid Society, Region of Halton v W(A), 2016 ONCJ 358,
2016 CarswellOnt 9713.
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NOVEL ISSUES: “RELIABILITY” IN HARD AND SOFT
SCIENCES
A more complicated issue that may arise at the voir dire stage is
whether there is a body of knowledge that is sufficiently reliable to
allow it to be the subject of expert testimony. As observed by Charron
J. (as she then was) in R. v. Olscamp (a case where she refused to
permit an expert to testify in a child sexual abuse prosecution that the
complainant’s condition was “consistent” with having been sexually
abused) the issue was not the qualifications of a particular witness, but
whether anyone could give the proposed expert testimony having
regard to the present state of knowledge in the field.36 As noted by
Charron J.A. (as she then was) in R. v. A.K.:
The evidence must meet a certain threshold of
reliability in order to have sufficient probative value to
meet the criterion of relevance. The relevance of the
evidence must also be considered with respect to the
second criterion of necessity. After all, it could hardly
be said that the admission of unreliable scientific
evidence is necessary for a proper adjudication to be
made by the trier of fact.37
Some cases, like the American precedent in Daubert v. Merrill
Dow Pharmaceuticals,38 state that expert evidence must have a
“scientific basis” to be reliable and admissible. It is, for example, the
basis of scientific research in the biological, medical, and physical
sciences (“hard sciences”) to use control groups and randomized
36

R v Olscamp, 1994 CarswellOnt 114, 35 CR (4th) 37 (Ont SC), at para 7.

37

R v AK, [1999] OJ 3280, 176 DLR (4th) 665 (CA) at para 84, per Charron
JA.

38

509 US 579, 113 S Ct 2786 (1993).
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studies, and expert evidence in these areas requires a foundation in
this type of research. However, even for expert evidence in hard
sciences to be considered “reliable,” the expert need not testify with
certainty as to a particular opinion. Experts will often testify in terms
of probabilities, and all tests have some type of “error rate.”39
At some point the error rate or uncertainty of a particular test or
area of knowledge becomes sufficiently high that a court may decide
it is insufficiently reliable to admit expert evidence based on this
type of test or in this area. An example of testing that does not meet
threshold reliability for admission in court is phallometric testing,40
which is commonly used by clinicians working with sexual
offenders to measure progress in treatment, and is sometimes
39

Some forensic tests are sometimes said to have a “zero error rate,” but this
is the theoretical compared to actual error rate, as there are human
proficiency issues that affect even “fool proof tests.” For example, some
interesting work has been done on errors in finger print testing. While
everyone has unique fingerprints (even identical twins who have the same
DNA), a study of American fingerprint experts found a false positive rate
of 0.5% and a false negative rate of 7.5%: Bradford T. Ulerya et al,
“Accuracy and reliability of forensic latent fingerprint decisions” (2011)
108:19 PNAS 7733–7738. There is less research on forensic DNA testing,
which (except for identical twins) has theoretical error rates of
approximately 1 in a billion, but actual error rates due to sample
contamination and human error might be as high as 1 in a thousand:
Mueller, L.D., “Forensic DNA Laboratory Error Rates”, (22 April 2002),
Online: <http://darwin.bio.uci.edu/~mueller/>. Retesting by an independent
lab would almost always prevent human error for DNA evidence, and
double checking forensic labs will reduce it.

40

As discussed in R v J-LJ, 2000 SCC 51, [2000] SCJ No 52, Phallometric
testing (or Penile Plethysmography) involves attachment of sensors to a
man’s penis while he is shown various images, including ones showing
adult consensual sexual images and images of naked children, and is
intended to detect sexual arousal to children.
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considered by police or child protection workers in their
investigations to help establish whether a man is likely to have
sexually abused a child. While useful for clinical and investigative
purposes, due to concerns about reliability, judges in criminal and
child protection cases have generally refused to admit testimony
based on the results of phallometric testing to help determine
whether a man sexually abused a child.41
Although there is utility in having expert evidence based on
physical (hard) sciences, with its often-precise measurements and
apparent certainty, there are also limitations and dangers to this type
of evidence. The Supreme Court observed that the trial process must
not, in effect, become an “attornment to the opinion of the expert,” a
possibility “exacerbated by the fact that expert evidence is resistant
to effective cross-examination by counsel who are not experts in that
field.”42 Few lawyers have the academic background or knowledge
to effectively review and understand scientific literature or crossexamine an expert testifying based on hard sciences. The reality is
that many judges lack the scientific background to effectively assess
the evidence of a hard science expert in the absence of effective
cross-examination or a testimony from an expert with a different
opinion. Later in this paper we discuss the overreliance on evidence
of drug and alcohol tests from the Motherisk Laboratory, and return
to this issue and the importance of having an expert for the parents
41

Ibid. See also Children's Aid Society of Algoma v ML, [2012] OJ No 3292
(OCJ); Children's Aid Society of the Region of Peel v SR-T, [2003] OJ 6146
(OCJ) . In the latter case, there was evidence that there was a “significant
risk” of false negatives and a “false positive rate” of 4–21%. While
generally not admissible at the trial stage, it is sometimes considered as a
part of the testimony of an expert based in part on phallometric testing at
sentencing or the dangerous offender stage of a criminal case because of the
lower standard for the admission of evidence.

42

R v DD, 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 SCR 275 at para 55.
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or defence to assist in the challenging of an expert called by the
Crown or child protection agency, especially one testifying based on
“hard science.”
The courts have recognized that there must be different
standards for the admission of evidence from experts regarding
“soft” or social and behavioural sciences compared to testimony
based on medical or other hard sciences. There are important areas,
especially in child-related disputes, where the expert’s opinion is
dependent on knowledge of social science literature and clinical
experience rather than reliance on reporting results of a test based on
rigorous scientific methodology. In R. v. Abbey, the Ontario Court of
Appeal held that in deciding whether to admit expert testimony by a
sociologist called by the Crown about the meaning of a “teardrop”
tattoo within street gang culture, the Crown needed to establish
“threshold reliability” of the proposed expert’s testimony. Doherty
J.A. held that the voir dire into the admissibility of the expert’s
testimony could address such issues as:
1. To what extent is the field in which the opinion is
offered a recognized discipline, profession or area of
specialized training?
2. To what extent is the work within that field subject
to quality assurance measures and appropriate
independent review by others in the field?
3. To the extent that the opinion rests on data
accumulated through various means such as
interviews, is the data accurately recorded, stored
and available?
4. To what extent are the reasoning processes
underlying the opinion and the methods used to
gather the relevant information clearly explained by
the witness and susceptible to critical examination
by a jury?
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5. To what extent has the expert arrived at his or her
opinion using methodologies accepted by those
working in the particular field in which the opinion
is advanced?
6. To what extent has the witness, in advancing the
opinion, honoured the boundaries and limits of the
discipline from which his or her expertise arises?
7. To what extent is the proffered opinion based on
data and other information gathered independently
of the specific case or, more broadly, the litigation
process?43
In Abbey, the Court of Appeal also commented:
Admissibility is not an all or nothing proposition. . . .
The trial judge may admit part of the proffered
testimony, modify the nature or scope of the proposed
opinion, or edit the language used to frame that
opinion. 44
The Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred in not permitting
the sociologist called by the Crown to testify about the range of
possible meanings of the tattoo, including that it signified the wearer
had killed a rival gang member, but ruled that the expert could not
43

Abbey, supra note 30 at para 119. See also R v Shafia, supra note 23 at
para 240, where the Court of Appeal upheld the admissibility of expert
evidence called by the Crown about culture and “honour killings,” with
Watt J.A. observing: “Scientific validity is not a condition precedent to the
admissibility of expert opinion evidence. Indeed, the great bulk of expert
opinion evidence admitted in our courts is given by experts in disciplines
that do not use the scientific method and whose opinions cannot be
scientifically validated.”

44

Supra note 30 at para 63.
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testify that the tattoo had only one specific meaning that amounted
to a “confession” of the “ultimate issue” of murder.
While social science expert evidence may be admissible, and
sometimes is highly relevant and persuasive, there may be concerns
about its reliability. This is especially true when party-retained
professionals, such police officers or child protection workers,
address issues of “common experience” or credibility.45 However,
lawyers without access to a consultant or expert with relevant
knowledge may find it less challenging to cross-examine an expert
testifying based on social science knowledge or professional
experience than one testifying based on research in the physical
sciences. Further, most judges have greater professional experience
with issues in the “soft sciences,” and can better assess the reliability
of social science expert testimony. Judges may be better able to limit
the weight of expert evidence regarding behavioural or social
science than evidence from a “hard scientist” whose testimony may
not be fully comprehended.

45

See for example R v Sekhon, supra note 21.
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WHITE BURGESS AND IMPARTIALITY
In White Burgess, the central issue was the allegation of bias of a
party’s expert, and its effect on the admissibility of the testimony as
expert evidence. Justice Cromwell held that if an expert witness does
not meet a “threshold requirement” for impartiality, his or her evidence
should not be admitted. If the witness meets the threshold, but
questions remain concerning impartiality, an apprehension of bias may
be a factor in the discretionary “cost-benefit analysis” of admissibility,
or in the weighing of the evidence.46 To establish impartiality for
threshold admissibility, Cromwell J. stated:
The expert’s opinion must be impartial in the sense
that it reflects an objective assessment of the
questions at hand. It must be independent in the sense
that it is the product of the expert’s independent
judgment, uninfluenced by who has retained him or
her or the outcome of the litigation. It must be
unbiased in the sense that it does not unfairly favour
one party’s position over another. The acid test is
whether the expert’s opinion would not change
regardless of which party retained him or her. . . .47
Justice Cromwell and the case’s outcome make clear that it will
be the “quite rare” case where expert evidence is excluded on the
basis of lack of “impartiality” due to a professional relationship with
one of the parties.48 Justice Cromwell provided some examples
where expert testimony was excluded due to lack of impartiality,
46

Supra note 7 at para 10.

47

Ibid at para 32. Emphasis added.

48

Ibid at para 49.
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including: the proposed expert was acting as counsel for one of the
parties; the expert was a party to the litigation him or herself; and the
expert’s retainer agreement was inappropriate because it was
contingent on a particular opinion or outcome.49 On its facts, White
Burgess indicates that a witness having a professional relationship
with a party, such as an accountant or therapist, does not normally
preclude that professional from giving expert evidence supporting
the party’s position in the litigation, as long as it is an honestly held
opinion founded on professional knowledge and expertise. With
regards to the procedure of proving impartiality, Cromwell J. wrote:
While I would not go so far as to hold that the expert's
independence and impartiality should be presumed
absent challenge, my view is that absent such
challenge, the expert's attestation or testimony
recognizing and accepting the duty will generally be
sufficient to establish that this threshold is met. . . .
This threshold requirement is not particularly onerous
and it will likely be quite rare that a proposed expert's
evidence would be ruled inadmissible for failing to
meet it. The trial judge must determine, having regard
to both the particular circumstances of the proposed
expert and the substance of the proposed evidence,
whether the expert is able and willing to carry out his
or her primary duty to the court.50
Justice Cromwell notes that in determining exclusion of an
expert’s evidence, it is the nature and extent of the relationship
between the expert and the party who has retained that expert that is
relevant, rather than the fact that there is a relationship. He cautioned
49

Ibid at para 37.

50

Ibid at paras 47–49. Emphasis added.
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that “[a]nything less than clear unwillingness or inability to [provide
the court with fair, objective, and non-partisan evidence] should not
lead to exclusion” but instead would go to weight.51 According to
Cromwell J., possible bias should be addressed when considering
whether an expert is properly qualified as part of the “threshold”
inquiry,52 as well as in the cost-benefit analysis discretionary
decision made by the trial judge to exclude otherwise admissible
expert evidence.53 If the testimony is admitted, bias may still also be
a factor in weighing it.
PARTICIPANT AND LITIGATION EXPERTS
If a person is called as an expert witness, provisions like Ontario’s
Family Law Rules normally require that notice and a copy of the
expert’s report be served on the other parties so they can adequately
prepare to cross-examine the expert.54 When a party is seeking to
have the court rely on expert evidence, the party proffering the
evidence should be prepared to establish the witness’ qualifications
and to have the expert cross-examined on the report, unless the other
party agrees to waive the appearance and accept the admission of the
report without the person testifying.

51

Ibid at para 49.

52

Ibid at para 53.

53

Ibid at para 54. See ibid at para 24 where Cromwell J. (adopting the
approach of Doherty J.A. in Abbey, supra note 30) observed that despite
passing the first step of Mohan, a trial judge must still evaluate whether the
evidence is “sufficiently beneficial to the trial process to warrant its
admission despite the potential harm to the trial process that may flow”
from its admission.

54

Ontario Family Law Rules, O Reg 439/07, r 20.1 [Family Law Rules].
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Recently, Ontario courts have begun to differentiate between
“participant experts” and “litigation experts,” a distinction with
potential procedural significance in many family and child welfare
cases.55 A “litigation expert” is an expert specifically retained by a
party to provide opinion testimony about a matter in dispute in
litigation. A party calling such an expert has the obligation of
providing an expert report to the court and other parties well in
advance of the proceeding, pursuant to the Ontario Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 53.0156 and the Family Law Rules, Rule 20.1.
A “participant expert” is a professional who has provided
services and had a relationship with a person apart from the
litigation, and is later called as an expert witness to provide an
opinion in ongoing litigation. In the context of child-related
litigation, a participant expert may be a physician or therapist who
has provided care or treatment to a child or parent, and then is called
as an expert to testify about the person’s treatment and express an
opinion about that person based on his or her professional
knowledge. The rules for the prior filing of “an expert report” do not
apply to a participant expert, as that professional had an on-going
relationship with the person, and is likely to a play a lesser role in
expressing opinions about the “ultimate issues” in a case.57 This
typically reduces the cost and complexity of involving such a
professional in the litigation. However, as with other witnesses in
civil cases, there is an obligation in family cases on parties calling

55

Westerhof v Gee Estate, 2015 ONCA 206, 124 OR (3d) 721.

56

RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 53.01.

57

Ibid.
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such a witness to disclose the substance of the testimony prior to a
hearing.58
While the rules for prior filing of an expert report do not apply
to participant experts, the court should be satisfied that the criteria
for admission of expert testimony have been satisfied before
considering that witness’s opinion evidence. As with other expert
witnesses, this would entail consideration of both expertise and
impartiality for the admissibility and weighting of the testimony. 59
COURT-ORDERED ASSESSMENTS IN CHILD-RELATED
CASES
In all Canadian jurisdictions, a judge in a family60 or child protection
proceeding61 has the jurisdiction to appoint a mental health
58

See e.g., Family Law Rules, r 23. The disclosure requirements of Rule 23
are important, but considerably less onerous than the requirements for
notice and provision of information under Rule 20.1 for expert witnesses.

59

White Burgess, supra note 7.

60

In Canada assessments can be ordered in Alberta, Rules of Court, Alta Reg
390/68, r 218; British Columbia, Family Relations Act, RSBC 1996, c 128,
s 15; Manitoba, The Family Maintenance Act, CCSM c. F20, s 3 and Court
of Queen’s Bench Act, CCSM c C280, s 49; New Brunswick, Judicature
Act, RSNB 1973, c J-2, s 11.4; Newfoundland, Children’s Law Act, RSN
1990, c C-13, s 36; Northwest Territories, Children’s Law Act, SNWT
1997, c 14, s 29; Nova Scotia, Judicature Act, RSNS 1990, c J-4, s 32F and
Maintenance and Custody Act, RSNS 1989, c 160, s 19; Ontario,
Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C-12, s 30 and Courts of Justice
Act, RSO 1990, c C-12, s 112; Prince Edward Island, Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act, RSPEI, c C-33, s 4.1; Yukon, Children’s Act, RSY
1986, c 22, s 43. It has also been held that a superior court has an inherent
jurisdiction to order an assessment: Cillis v Cillis, 1980 CarswellOnt 315,
20 RFL (2d) 208 (Ont HC).
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professional to undertake an assessment62 of the child and parents in
order to provide a report for the court and the parties. Such courtappointed experts have a unique role, testifying partially about the
results of their factual investigations, and partially about their opinions.
There is a significant body of social science literature on
conducting child custody and access assessments in family cases and
parenting capacity assessments in child protection cases.63 A number
of professional organizations and regulatory bodies have developed

61

See e.g., Ontario Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c C-11, s 54;
and Court Ordered Assessments, Ontario Reg 25/07; and Child Youth and
Family Enhancement Act, SA 2004, c 16, s 21.1(3)(b).

62

Child custody and access “assessments” is the term used in Canada for
these court-ordered expert reports in family cases, while the term child
custody “evaluations” or “forensic evaluations” is more often used in the
United States. In child protection cases, these are often called “parenting
capacity assessments.”

63

See e.g., Leslie Drozd, Nancy Olesen & Michael Saini, Parenting Plan &
Child Custody Evaluations: Using Decision Trees to Increase Evaluator
Competence & Avoid Preventable Errors (Sarasota, FL: Professional
Resource Press, 2013); Rachel Birnbaum, Barbara Jo Fidler & Katherine
Kavassalis, Child Custody and Access Assessments: A Resource Guide for
Legal and Mental Health Professionals (Toronto: Thomson Carswell
Publishing, 2008); Jonathan Gould & David Martindale, The Art and
Science of Child Custody Evaluations (New York: Guilford Press, 2007);
Philip Michael Stahl, Conducting Child Custody Evaluations: A
Comprehensive Guide (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999);
American Psychological Association (APA), “Guidelines for Child
Custody Evaluations in Family Law Proceedings” (2010) 65:9 AM Psychol
863; and Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (AFCC), “Model
Standards of Practice for Child Custody Evaluation” (2007), 45 Fam Ct
Rev 70.
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guidelines for conducting assessments in family64 and child
protection proceedings.65 Although there is not a single standardized
methodology, the assessment process is invariably “multimodal,”
involving a range of ways of gaining an understanding of the needs
of children, the capacities of the parents, and the relationship of each
parent and child. Interviews with parents and children and
observation of parent-child interactions are very important parts of
the process.
An assessor will also usually review court documents and
previous reports about family members, and contact “collateral
sources”; various individuals who know the family, including
professionals like teachers and coaches, as well as neighbours,
relatives, and new partners. If a psychologist is involved, there may
be psychological testing of the parents, and perhaps children, though
there are no tests that can conclusively establish who is a good
parent, or what child care arrangement will be “best” for a child. If
psychological testing is used, the psychologist should be familiar
with the current literature and latest versions of the tests, as well as
64

See e.g., Ontario College of Social Workers and Social Service Workers,
“Practice Guidelines for Custody and Access Assessments”, (1 September
2009), online: <http://ocswssw.org>; Gregory Stevens "Custody and
Access Assessments in Saskatchewan: Format, Process, and a Practitioner’s
Opinion”,
(September
2004),
online:
<http://redengine.lawsociety.sk.ca/inmagicgenie/documentfolder/AC5609.p
df>; Newfoundland & Labrador Association of Social Workers, “Standards
for Child Custody and Access Assessments”, (8 January 2007), online:
<http://www.nlasw.ca>.

65

T Pezzot-Pearce & J Pearce, Parenting Assessments in Child Welfare
Cases: A Practical Guide (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2004);
Peter Choate & Karen Hudson, “Parenting Capacity Assessments: When
They Serve and When They Detract in Child Protection Matters” (2014) 33
Can Fam LQ.
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their limitations, especially for the particular parents and children
being assessed.
The professional who conducts a court-ordered assessment
should have relevant knowledge, expertise, and experience.
Assessors also need to understand the cultural context of the parents
and children, which may be especially important in child protection
cases.66 There is also growing awareness of the complexity of cases
that involve children with special needs (e.g., learning disabilities,
physical health issues, cognitive delay, Asperger Spectrum
Disorder), refusal to visit a parent, or where parents have a high
conflict separation, especially if it involves domestic violence, or
one or both parents have substance abuse or mental health
problems.67 These cases require a specialized assessment and
analysis, in addition to the mental health professional being
competent and qualified in understanding child development,
attachment, family dynamics, and knowledge of relevant case law
and legal standards.
66

See e.g., Karen S. Budd, "Assessing Parenting Capacity in a Child Welfare
Context" (2005), 27:4 Children & Youth Services Rev 429; and Sandra
Azar & Linda Cote, "Sociocultural issues in the evaluation of the needs of
children in custody decision making: What do our current frameworks for
evaluating parenting practices have to offer?" (2002) 25:3 Int'l JL &
Psychiatry 193–217.

67

Birnbaum, Fidler & Kavassalis, supra note 63; Rachel Birnbaum et al.,
“Co-parenting Children with Neurodevelopmental Disorders” in Kathryn
Kuehnle & Leslie Drozd, eds, Parenting Plan Evaluations: Applied
Research for the Family Court (New York: Oxford UP, 2016) 270; Jo
Fidler, Nicholas Bala & Michael Saini, Children Who Resist Postseparation Parental Contact: A Differential Approach for Legal and
Mental Health Professionals (New York: Oxford UP, 2012). On the issue of
concern about whether assessors have adequate training in dealing with cases
involving domestic violence, see e.g., Rahman & Track, supra note 3.
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While the assessment process should be informed by social
science research, assessors will inevitably also engage in assessing
the credibility of different sources of information and establishing a
factual basis for their opinions, and using their own individual
professional judgement, experience, and values in formulating
recommendations. The broad concerns about reliability, impartiality,
trial efficiency, and fairness that apply to the admission and
weighing of expert evidence are also relevant to assessment reports.
However, there are unique features of the court-ordered assessment
process that result in some differences in the legal treatment of
party-retained experts and court-appointed assessors.
In practice, many requests for an assessment are informal and
made on consent. While assessments can be very useful for the parties
and court, and can facilitate settlement and judicial decision-making,
the process is intrusive for both parents and children, so there is
understandable judicial scrutiny if the request for an assessment is
opposed. Further, the assessment process is expensive (often starting in
the range of $5,000 to $10,000, potentially much higher) and can take
months to complete, possibly delaying a trial.
In all provinces, if the court orders an assessment in a child
protection case, it is almost always paid for by the government. In
family cases, in all provinces a judge can direct that one or both parents
pay for an assessment, provided that they have the means. Courts in
some provinces also have limited authority to direct or request that a
government agency fund the preparation of an assessment in a family
case, but the agency will usually select the assessor. In Ontario, for
example, the court can order that parents pay for an assessment under
the Children’s Law Reform Act s. 30, in which case a specific
professional, often a psychologist, will be identified in the order to
prepare the report, but this is only realistic if the parents have
significant resources as the parents must pay for this type of report.
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An Ontario court may also direct that the Office of the Children’s
Lawyer (OCL) consider involvement in a family case. The OCL will
decide whether to appoint a lawyer for the child, undertake a “clinical
investigation,” or do both or neither. While there is no charge to
parents for the involvement of the OCL, for budgetary reasons it is
only involved in about half of the family cases where there is a judicial
request,68 most often to provide a “clinical investigation report,”
usually prepared by a social worker designated by the Office. As a
result of government budgetary limits and parental lack of resources to
pay for an assessment, there are many family cases where it would be
desirable to have a court-appointed expert report, but none is available.
While most court-appointed assessments are undertaken on a
consensual basis, often reflected in a consent order, there are cases
where one party requests an assessment and the other party objects.
There is some controversy in the jurisprudence over the test courts
should apply when the judge must rule on whether or not to order
an assessment. Some cases have taken a relatively narrow approach,
concluding there needs to be a “clinical issue” to order an
assessment in a family case. 69 In the 2012 Ontario case of Baille v.
Middleton, Pazaratz J. reviewed the case law and adopted a “clinical
issues” test for determining when to order an assessment,
concluding:
Assessments should be limited to cases in which there
are clinical issues to be determined, in order that such
68

For concerns about the inability of the OCL to fill all requests for service
and delays in responding to requests, see Ontario Office of the Auditor
General, 2013 Auditor General’s Annual Report (2013), Chapter 4, Section
4.10.

69

See e.g., Linton v Clarke (1993), 50 RFL (3d) 8 (Ont Ct (Gen Div)), affd 10
RFL (4th) 92, 21 OR (3d) 568 (Div Ct).
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assessments can provide expert evidence on the
appropriate manner to address the emotional and
psychological stresses within the family unit in the
final determination of custody. . . . Clinical issues
have been loosely defined as being “those behavioral
or psychological issues about which the average
reasonable person would need assistance in
understanding . . . not limited to psychiatric illness or
serious psychological impairment.”70
Most cases, however, have rejected this narrow “clinical issues”
test and take a broader approach. In its 2006 decision in Ursic v.
Ursic,71 the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the decision to impose
joint custody in a high-conflict separation. The Court of Appeal relied
heavily on a post-trial assessment by a mental health professional
that had been ordered by the court as part of the appeal process. The
appeal court noted the assessor’s opinion “buttressed” the trial
decision, and the appellate court varied the details of the parenting
plan to accord with the specific proposal of the assessor rather than
the Judge’s original order. The Court of Appeal also commented
favourably on the importance of the assessment undertaken after trial
and before the appeal, as ordered by a judge of the Court of Appeal.
The decision in Ursic recognized the value of the opinions of
court-appointed mental health professionals in high-conflict childrelated disputes. Significantly, the Court of Appeal did not
70

2012 ONSC 3728 at paras 23-24. For a child welfare case where the court
refused to order an assessment because the agency seeking the
assessment failed to establish the possibility harm to the child from
being placed in the care of her father, see Children’s Aid Society for the
Region of Halton v N(RR), 2008 ONCJ 95, 170 ACWS (3d) 319 per Zisman
J.

71

[2006] OJ 2178 (CA), 32 RFL (6th) 23.
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suggest that there needed to be a “clinical issue” before an
assessment is ordered. Instead, the Court indicated that in a highconflict separation, it is sufficient for the assessment to be “useful.”
In the 2013 Ontario decision Glick v. Cale, Kiteley J. extensively
reviewed the jurisprudence and rejected the narrow “clinical issues”
approach, citing the Court of Appeal decision in Ursic, observing
that “judges are not trained to identify ‘clinical issues.’”72 Justice
Kiteley suggested a non-exhaustive list of criteria which might assist
a judge in deciding whether to order an assessment, including
consideration of whether it is "high conflict" separation, and whether
the children appear to be stressed or having behavioural problems. 73
It is submitted that the broader approach of Ursic, Glick v. Cale, and
other recent cases74 is preferable to the narrower “clinical issues”
approach in deciding whether to order an assessment, however, it
is not appropriate to have an assessment in every contested childrelated dispute. The assessment process can be expensive for the
parties, as well as intrusive for parents and children. If a request for
an assessment is opposed, the onus is on the party seeking the
assessment to establish the “evidentiary foundation” to establish the
need for an assessment and that the benefits outweigh the costs. In
family cases, a “bald assertion” that it is a “high conflict separation”
may not suffice to obtain an order for an assessment; a party seeking
an assessment may need to provide independent affidavit evidence
of the negative effects of such issues as separation on the children,
high conflict, problems with access, or parental dysfunction. 75

72

2013 ONSC 893, [2013] OJ 573 at para 45.

73

Ibid at para 48.

74

See e.g., Ryan v Scott, 2013 ONSC 4759, 2013 CarswellOnt 9783 per
Mesbur J and KMP v JVER, 2016 YKSC 10.

75

Morton v Morton, 2015 ONSC 4633, 2015 CarswellOnt 11038.
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Lawyers (or self-represented parents) involved in cases should be
satisfied about the experience and views of a professional nominated as
the assessor. In many cases, the parties agree on the professional who
will conduct the assessment. If there is no agreement, the supporting
materials for the motion for appointment should include the curriculum
vitae of the proposed assessors. The court should consider the expected
cost and time to complete the assessment, as well as each assessor’s
experience and issues of potential bias.
In Karar v. Abo-El-Ella,76 the court ordered an assessment on
consent, but the parties could not agree who would do the assessment.
The mother’s counsel proposed a psychologist in the city where the
parties resided, while the father’s counsel objected due to the mother’s
profession as a psychiatrist and the possibility she might have had
colleagues who knew the psychologist proposed (though there was no
evidence of this). The father proposed a psychologist from a more
distant city; the mother objected because the father claimed the mother
alienated the children from him, and his proposed psychologist had
written extensively about “parental alienation syndrome” and his
personal experiences with his estranged son. In ordering the mother’s
proposed psychologist to conduct the assessment, Beaudoin J.
observed there was a “reasonable apprehension of bias” for the father’s
proposed psychologist because of his published work, and concluded
that the father’s concerns about the mother’s proposed assessor were
“based on speculation.”
Once an assessment is ordered, legislation generally provides that
a report prepared by the assessor named in the order is “admissible” in
evidence, which suggests that there is no need for a voir dire on its
admissibility,77 though it is common for the court to conduct a process
of qualifying the expert before that professional testifies.78
76

2016 ONSC 1564, 2016 CarswellOnt 4171, per Beaudoin J.

77

If the order directs that the assessment is to be undertaken by one
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PARTY-RETAINED CRITIQUE EVIDENCE OF COURTAPPOINTED ASSESSORS
It is clear that a party can retain and call its own qualified expert to
challenge or limit the opinion of an expert called by the other party
to testify. This is an inherent aspect of the adversarial process.
Further, each party can cross-examine a court-appointed assessor
and question the process adopted or opinions expressed.79 A party
may also challenge the basis of an assessor’s opinions and
recommendations, for example by calling other evidence to question
the accuracy of the factual basis of the expert’s opinion. However,
different issues arise when a party wants to call their own expert to
challenge or “critique” the methodology or opinions of a courtappointed assessor after the assessor’s report is prepared and filed
with the court. While there is controversy about whether a partyretained expert can challenge an opinion or recommendations
expressed by an assessor appointed by the court, in our view, the
preferable approach is to allow parties to introduce expert critique

professional or member of the staff of a clinic and that person delegates
significant portions of the assessment process to other professionals or staff
members without the permission of the court, the report may not be
admissible: see CAS London v B(CD), 2013 ONSC 2858, 2013
CarswellOnt 8125, per Harper J.
78

See e.g., Children's Aid Society, Region of Halton v W(A), 2016 ONCJ 358,
2016 CarswellOnt 9713.

79

The opportunity to test and cross-examine the recommendations of a courtappointed assessor is critical, and as a result it will only be in “rare or
exceptional” cases that a court will rely on an assessor’s recommendations
at an interim hearing, as there is no opportunity to fully challenge those
views; for one of those rare cases where a court did base an interim ruling
to vary custody, see Ly v Wade, 2016 ONSC 1155, 2016 CarswellOnt 2418
per Pazaratz J.
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testimony, provided that it meets the test for admission of expert
evidence, and is appropriately focused.
In the 2015 Ontario Court of Appeal judgement in M. v. F.,80
Benotto J.A., in obiter, expressed concern about the utility and
admissibility of “critique evidence” admitted at trial to challenge the
opinions of a court-appointed assessor about appropriate parenting
arrangements. This case involved a high conflict parenting dispute
about overnight visitation with the father for a six year old boy, and
the trial judge largely based his decision to allow overnight visits on
the recommendation of the court-appointed psychologist. Justice
Benotto upheld the trial decision, and noted that the court-appointed
assessor had been involved with the family “for nearly all of the
child's life,” while the psychologist retained by the mother to
comment on the recommendations of the assessor had never met the
child or parties in a clinical setting, and never met the father. Justice
Benotto found the party-retained expert’s “self-described task was to
‘raise concerns’ about the court-appointed assessment,” and
concluded:
It would be difficult to find that such evidence meets
the criteria of Mohan [for the admission of expert
evidence]. . . . critique evidence is rarely appropriate.
It generally—as here—has little probative value, adds
expense and risks elevating the animosity between the
parties.81
As Benotto J.A. explained, expert critique evidence about a
court-appointed assessment must meet the Mohan (now White
Burgess) test for admissibility. A restrictive approach to the second
80

Supra note 5.

81

Ibid at paras 33–34.
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stage “cost benefit” weighing for the admission is appropriate in a
high conflict dispute between parents where the “critique expert” has
not assessed the child.82 In these parenting dispute cases, the “cost”
of admission of evidence from a party-retained expert, in terms of
lengthening the proceedings and adding to their complexity, can be
relatively high. Notably, on the facts of M. v. F., the parties both
consented to the appointment of the assessor who was a psychologist
well known to both as he had already been involved in mediation
efforts with them.
Issues of lengthening the trial and expense were especially
pronounced in M. v. F., a long running high conflict parental dispute,
which was focused not on whether the child would have a
relationship with both parents, but rather on the details of the
parenting plan. Significantly, and inappropriately, the psychologist
whom the mother retained to provide a critique went so far as to
make recommendations about the “ultimate issue” of the most
suitable parenting plan and overnight visitation, without having
assessed either the child or parents, or having established a basis for
that opinion.
In some cases, especially high conflict family cases involving
claims of alienation, a party may retain a mental health professional
to interview the child and express an opinion about the significance
of those views that is contrary to that of the court-appointed
assessor. Even if that professional has undertaken assessments and
has been accepted as an expert in other family cases, the courts have
had understandable concern about the limited value of such
evidence. Similar to the approach in M. v. F., in such cases a court
may decide that the expert opinion of such a professional is not
admissible, though the statements made to the professional by the
child are likely admissible hearsay under the “state of mind”
82

Mohan, supra note 11 at para 21; White Burgess, supra note 7 at para 19.
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exception.83
It is appropriate for a court in a case like M. v. F., dealing with a
dispute between parents, to refuse to consider recommendations
about the “best interests” of a child from a professional who has
been retained by one party and not assessed both parents. Indeed,
leading child custody evaluators84 and professional standards for
mental health professionals highlight that it is not professionally
appropriate to express opinions that reflect on a person whom the
professional has not properly interviewed and assessed. However,
there is also a significant body of literature85 and Canadian
jurisprudence which recognizes a potentially valuable role for
83

See e.g., F(V) v Halton CAS, 2016 ONCJ 111, 2016 CarswellOnt 3035,
where, in a very high conflict case, the court-appointed assessor had
recommended a transfer of custody of a 13-year old girl to her father, from
whom she had been alienated. The Family Court followed the assessor’s
recommendation, and ordered custody to the father. In a child protection
application brought by the child (with mother’s assistance), child’s counsel
retained a social worker who had significant experience as an assessor to
interview the girl and prepare a report. The court admitted the social
worker’s statements of what the child told him (namely that she wanted to
live with the mother). However, Kurz J. refused to admit his opinions about
the girl’s competence to make decisions and perceptions of her parents, as
the basis for these opinions had not been sufficiently established, since he
had not interviewed both the parents and hence did not have sufficient basis
for his opinions to be admitted as expert evidence.
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professionals retained by one party to comment on or review a report
prepared by a court-appointed assessor.
As recognized by the British Columbia Supreme Court in the
2010 case Hejzlar v. Mitchell-Hejzlar, testimony by a party-retained
psychologist who is a “critic” of a court-appointed psychologist is
only admissible if it complies with the their professional standards,
in this case the Code of Conduct of the BC College of Psychologists,
which dictates what psychologists can do when they are reviewing
the report of another psychologist: (a) they must limit comments to
methods and procedures; (b) they must not state any conclusions
unless they have done their own individual assessments; and (c) they
must restrict themselves to comments as to their sufficiency and
accuracy.86
Judges of the British Columbia Supreme Court have continued
to exercise their “gatekeeping function” and rule evidence
inadmissible or give no weight to testimony from party-retained
mental health professionals who are critical of the recommendations
of a court-appointed assessor and reached conclusions about the
“best interests” of children or make diagnoses about parents whom
they have not met.87 Judges are especially concerned about opinions
from party-retained professionals who lack experience in conducting
assessments, and have become allied with the party who retained
them.
However, consistent with Hejzlar v. Mitchell-Hejzlar, the British
Columbia courts have accepted that parties may retain qualified,
experienced professionals who may review the assessor’s report and
testify about the methodological limitations and recommendations of
86
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a court-appointed assessor, provided that they are not making their
own recommendations about the most appropriate parenting plan or
the child’s best interests. In some cases, including the recent
decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in A.S.P. v. N.N.J.,
considerable weight has been given to some of the opinions of a
party-retained professional who has undertaken a review of the work
of a court-appointed assessor as the basis for discounting the
recommendations of the court-appointed assessor.88
In the 2016 decision of the Ontario Superior in Luo v. Le,89 a
case involving allegations of alienation, the court admitted a “reply
report” from a social worker retained by the mother, commenting on
the report of two court-appointed mental health professionals that
had recommended reversal of custody from the mother to the father
and attendance by family members at a controversial “intensive
reunification” program in British Columbia. The court noted that the
purpose of this reply report was to “assess the process” undertaken
and recommendations made by the court-appointed experts. Justice
Chaney observed that the reply report was “primarily a generic
discussion of the uncertainty and debate surrounding the causes and
appropriate interventions in relation to parental alienation.”90 While
the judge suggested that the reply report in this case was “not very
helpful,” it is notable that the court rejected the recommendation of
the court-appointed experts, and used significant information from
the party-retained expert in reaching his conclusion. Although the
88
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6022.

89

2016 ONSC 202, [2016] WDFL 1131.

90

Ibid at para 26.

Addressing Controversies About Experts in Disputes Over Children

109

issue of the admissibility of the report of the mother’s expert does
not appear to have directly arisen, it is significant that this evidence
did not purport to be an assessment of the parties and child, did not
offer recommendations about the child’s best interests, and would be
admissible under the test set out in Hejzlar v. Mitchell-Hejzlar.
The admission of the type of expert commentary on the
methodology of a court-appointed assessor and a summary of
“generic [social science] knowledge” is also consistent with
standards proposed by leading forensic mental health
professionals,91 who point out that given the wide variability in the
education and experiences of those who undertake assessments, and
the limited scope of professional regulation of this type of work, it is
important to have external review of the work of assessors. Further,
allowing for review testimony may encourage parties who are
dissatisfied with the recommendations of an assessor to obtain their
own objective, professional review, which, if it substantially
confirms the original report, may facilitate settlement.
CRITIQUE EVIDENCE OF GOVERNMENT-RETAINED
EXPERTS
In M. v. F. and similar cases, the courts were considering the
admission of evidence from a mental health professional retained by
a parent to testify about a report prepared by a court-appointed
91

Austin, Dale, Kirkpatrick & Flens, supra note 84; Birnbaum, Fidler &
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assessor who was nominated by the court, either with the consent of
both parties or at least with opportunity for them to make
submissions about the selection of an assessor. It is submitted that
when the government has had a role in the selection of the assessor,
or is a party to the litigation, in considering the admissibility of
critique evidence a different judicial cost-benefit analysis at the
second stage of the Mohan and White Burgess tests is appropriate;
courts should give parents who disagree with the opinions of a
government-retained expert greater scope for introducing their own
expert evidence to challenge those opinions.
This situation may arise, for example, in family litigation in
Ontario if a parent seeks the admission of evidence from a partyretained expert to critique the report of a clinical investigator from
the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL). Although the parties
may have consented or had an opportunity to make submissions
prior to the order requesting the involvement of the OCL, they have
no involvement in the selection of the specific clinical investigator.
While many OCL clinical investigators are highly competent and
experienced, some may have less academic qualifications than the
professionals undertaking court-ordered (and party paid)
assessments under the CLRA s. 30,92 and they sometimes have only
limited experience in the field.93 In a number of recent Ontario cases
92

Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c 12, s 30.
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See, however, Mayfield v Mayfield, [2001] OJ 2212, 18 RFL (5th) 328
(SCJ), per Wein J., where the court refused to admit party-retained critique
evidence about a report prepared by an OCL clinical investigator. This
decision is problematic since the government selected OCL clinical
investigator was undertaking one of her first assessments, and a parent was
precluded from submitting testimony from a highly experienced assessor.
In Greenough v Greenough, 46 RFL (5th) 414, [2003] OJ 4227 Quinn J.
questioned Mayfield and held that a mother could call an expert whom she
had retained to critique the methodology used by a psychologist whom both
parents had agreed would undertake an assessment.
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the courts have commented on the “bias”94 of a government-selected
clinical investigator, the unreliability of the investigator’s
conclusions about the presence of parental alienation,95 or the
clinician’s under-appreciation of the effects of domestic violence.96
In situations where the expertise of a government-selected assessor
is questioned, there is a strong argument for the admission of
critique evidence submitted by a party.
There is also a strong argument for the admission of critique
evidence from an expert retained by a parent concerning an
assessment under the Child and Family Services Act s. 5497 for use
in a child protection proceeding, where the state is a party and the
order sought is severance of the parent-child relationship. An
example of a flexible approach in child protection cases to the
admission of expert critique evidence is provided by Children's Aid
Society, Region of Halton v. W. (A.).98 The agency was seeking to
have two children made permanent wards with the plan that they
remain in kinship care with continuing parental contact, while the
parents, who had separated by the time of the final trial, each wanted
to resume care of the children. A court-appointed assessor undertook
an initial parenting capacity assessment, and recommended that the
children be made permanent wards and remain in their kinship
placement. The mother, represented by counsel from a legal aid
clinic, was able to retain an expert who had experience undertaking
this type of assessment to testify about the methodology and
psychological tests administered by the court-appointed assessor.
94
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After conducting a voir dire, the court admitted the critique
testimony as expert evidence, with O’Connell J. observing:
In this case, the critique evidence . . . relates to a[n] . .
. assessment under the CFSA for use in a child
protection proceeding where the state is a party (and
the applicant) to the proceeding and the order being
sought is crown wardship—the permanent severance
of the parent-child relationship. Further, the critique
was solely concerned with the validity and reliability
of the scientific testing conducted, as well as the
methodology and process used. . . .
The use of critique evidence by vulnerable parents in
child protection proceedings commenced by the state
against them is fundamentally different than the
critique evidence used in a high conflict parenting
dispute about overnight visitation, which was the case
of M. v. F. . . . 99
The court noted the critique expert was a “reasonable and
reliable witness,” who “although hired by the mother, was not a
‘hired gun.’” In many other cases he had been a court-appointed
assessor and this was only the third time that he had been retained to
provide a critique of a court-appointed expert, and on the two prior
occasions he found nothing wrong with the assessment and reported
that to counsel.100 In this case, however, the expert raised significant
99

Ibid at paras 263–64. For another child protection case where the court
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concerns about the tests and methodology used by the courtappointed assessor, including use of outdated tests and conducting
all of the interviews and tests of the parents on a single day, contrary
to normal practice, though fairly noting that it could not be known
whether these concerns would have affected the ultimate opinion.
The court concluded that in light of the critique of the party-retained
expert, it should treat the conclusions of the court-appointed assessor
“with considerable caution and placed very little, if any weight” on
the opinions of the assessor.101 In the end, however, the court made
the order sought by the agency based on other evidence. The
decision of O’Connell J. in Children's Aid Society, Region of Halton
v. W. (A.), illustrates the importance of taking account of the role of
the state in obtaining expert evidence in considering how to
undertake the cost-benefit analysis of admitting critique expert
evidence put forward by a parent.
Even in child protection cases, however, scrutiny should be
given to the admission of evidence from “critique experts” who have
no direct knowledge of the parents or children, and little or no
experience with undertaking assessments, but rather are retained
solely to comment on the process used in an assessment. In C.A.S.
of Toronto v. O.(K.),102 the African-Canadian mother of twin girls
who were Crown wards and the subject of a status review hearing
proposed to call a professional with a doctorate in education to
critique a psychologist’s court-ordered assessment, specifically to
testify about the unreliability of some of the psychological tests
performed for members of cultural minority groups. Justice Spence
concluded that the “threshold reliability” test of Mohan was not
satisfied, based on the “lack of research on the subject in the
scientific community” within which the proposed expert worked.
101
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The mother also wanted the expert to testify about the lack of
“cultural sensitivity” of the agency in dealing with visible
minority children. Justice Spence ruled that the proposed expert
could not establish he had current knowledge of the practices of the
agency, and hence was not qualified to express an opinion on that
subject. Further, t h e parts of the proposed testimony concerning the
lack of “racial and cultural sensitivity” of the agency did not meet
the Mohan criteria of “necessity”, since these matters were “within
the experience of triers of fact who live in such a diverse place as
the city of Toronto. . . .”103 The judge also expressed a concern that
the proposed expert, while a distinguished academic and community
member, appeared to be coming to court “more as an advocate
rather than as a scientist,” as he was prepared to proffer an opinion
without even having seen the assessment report in question and had
no direct experience in undertaking assessments.104
EXPERTS CALLED BY PARENTS AND “ONE-SIDED
ASSESSMENTS”
Given the limited resources of parents involved in family and child
protection litigation, and the importance of perspectives of
professionals involved with the family, it is submitted that there
should not be too high of a threshold for the admission of opinion
evidence from “participant professionals” with direct knowledge of
a parent’s case (as a result of providing services to the parents or
children). Of course, the ultimate weight of this evidence will be for
the court to determine.105
103
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Although a qualified professional who has treated a parent or
child should generally be permitted to express an opinion about that
person,106 such a professional should not be permitted to express an
opinion about the parenting arrangement that will promote the
child’s best interests, as they have not assessed the entire family.107
While there may be concerns that a professional who is treating a
parent, or who is retained by one parent in a high conflict separation
to provide treatment to a child, may become “allied” with that parent
and hence “los[e] some objectivity,”108 this type of concern should
normally only affect the weight of that expert’s evidence rather than
its admissibility. It is important to appreciate that in some cases a
therapist or doctor who has had a long-term relationship with a
parent or child may have opinions and information about their
patient or client that are better founded than those of a courtappointed assessor.109
While there is an important role for participant experts in child
related cases, there should be careful scrutiny of the admissibility of
litigation experts retained by one parent solely to provide an opinion
to the court. In family disputes, there are not infrequently concerns
about unreliability and potential bias as a basis for refusing to admit
testimony from a mental health professional who has been retained
106
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to undertake a “one-sided assessment” that purports to comment on a
parenting plan without having met both parents.110
CHILD PROTECTION AGENCY STAFF AND RETAINED
EXPERTS
In a child welfare hearing, it is not uncommon for the child protection
agency to seek to introduce expert opinion evidence from
professionals whom the agency employs or regularly retains. These
staff or retained professionals may have been providing services to a
child or to the parents before the case goes to a hearing, or may be
involved in making plans for the child’s future.
There is no doubt that properly qualified child protection agency
staff and professionals retained by the agency can give expert
evidence, and there is also some scope for child protection staff to
provide “lay opinion” evidence about such matters as parental
affection and demeanour.
However, there are potentially
contentious issues about the extent to which agency staff social
workers should be permitted to express opinions about the central
issues before the court. For example, in Catholic Children’s Aid
Society of Hamilton Wentworth v. S. (J.), Steinberg U.F.C.J.
observed:
I note that some of the commentators . . . have written
regarding a certain laxity . . . in certain [family]
Courts toward admission of expert evidence. . . . That
view ought not to apply in [child protection] cases
110
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parenting plan and his capacities as a parent.
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where the contested issue is whether or not a child
should be made a Crown ward and adopted or
returned home. . . . This issue is of such importance
that laxity or latitude in the admission of expert
evidence ought not to be accepted. 111
A consideration of the issues at stake in a child protection
proceeding and of the principles articulated in the Supreme Court
expert evidence jurisprudence can help courts to decide whether to
admit opinion evidence from agency staff. A major concern reflected
in Supreme Court decisions is the apparent lack of independence of
some expert witnesses. In Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. W.,
Mackinnon J. ruled that a child protection CAS worker who had a key
role in the agency’s decision-making process to seek permanent
wardship was not qualified to give “expert evidence” about the
appropriateness of that position. The judge observed that she “also
wish[ed] to highlight the caution to be exercised before accepting a
staff employee as an expert witness for that party on an issue central to
the outcome of the case.”112 While White Burgess clearly establishes
that being an employee of a party to litigation does not prevent a
111
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properly qualified child protection agency staff member from
providing expert evidence,113 the comments of Mackinnon J. point to
the need for courts to carefully consider the relationship of the
proffered expert as one of the factors to weigh in deciding whether to
admit the evidence.
If there is a concern about an agency staff member providing
expert opinion evidence, there should be a voir dire to establish that
person’s expertise and whether those opinions should be admissible as
expert evidence. The fact that a person is on agency staff should be
considered by the trial judge in determining both the admissibility and
weight of the evidence. Issues of institutional bias or impartiality
may also arise with a psychologist in private practice if a significant
portion of his or her professional practice is based on referrals from
the local child protection agency. Chief Judge Stuart of the Yukon
Territorial Court recognized the subtle but potentially “insidious
nature” of a parenting capacity assessment prepared by an expert
regularly retained by the child protection agency:
The party calling an expert has more than just a subtle
influence over the nature of expert testimony. In
selecting, directing, and paying for expert testimony,
the department gains a significant advantage over the
parents. . . . to ensure the integrity of the process
and to give meaning to fundamental principles of
justice, the use of expert evidence must be fair.
Several options exist to ensure expert evidence does
not undermine a parent’s ability to effectively
participate, and thereby ensure a child’s best interests
are fairly and properly determined. To avoid
113
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unnecessary costs, one expert can often suffice . . .
Input on the selection and focus of the expert can be
made in court by all parties. . . .114
In the Northwest Territories case of Re A,115 the judge admitted the
testimony of a psychologist retained by the Director of Child and
Family Services and accepted as an expert by the parents, but gave the
testimony very little weight due to concerns about bias and cultural
insensitivity. The psychological testing of the parents, which included
a standardized IQ test, was normed using the general Canadian
population. The judge took judicial notice that the Inuvialuit
population—of which both parents were members—was markedly
different than the general Canadian population and likely
underrepresented in the population used to norm the tests. This caused
the judge to have “considerable difficulty with the accuracy of the
intelligence measures” as presented by the expert witness.116 Further,
in cross-examination the expert conceded that when faced with two
conflicting test results, he chose to rely on the test that showed the
greater potential for the children being at higher risk, as this offered the
children the most protection. This approach caused the court
considerable concern, and the judge observed:
Evidence must be interpreted in an impartial and
neutral manner. At the end of the day when
determining what orders are to be made, the best
interests of the children must be the court's only
consideration. However, that cannot require that each
piece of evidence must be interpreted in a manner that
114
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favours the children being placed in the Director's
care and custody. . . .
I do not necessarily believe that Dr. X was colouring
his testimony to support the Director's position. . . .
Nevertheless, his stated approach to interpreting the
results of the tests he administered is dubious and
calls into question his general objectivity.117
Concerns about bias and potential unreliability of professionals
regularly retained by child protection agencies and often effectively
“allied” with the agency were also highlighted in the recent Lang
Review of expert testimony from the Motherisk Laboratory in
Toronto.118
THE MOTHERISK CASES AND EXPERT EVIDENCE IN
CHILD WELFARE CASES
While expert evidence in child-related cases is most commonly from
mental health professionals and based on social sciences, there have
also been serious concerns about expert medical or “hard science”
evidence in these cases, especially child welfare cases.
In 2008, the Goudge Commission Report documented the effects
of misleading expert testimony of forensic paediatric pathologist Dr.
Charles Smith of Toronto’s Hospital for Sick Children. Dr. Smith’s
now discredited testimony resulted in a number of wrongful criminal
convictions, and at least one case where a child was removed from
117
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parental care, made a Crown ward, and adopted.119 Concerns about
the reliability of expert evidence in child abuse and neglect cases
were again an issue as a result of the 2014 Ontario Court of Appeal
decision in R v. Broomfield,120 where a mother’s criminal conviction
for giving her infant cocaine was based largely on testimony by a
toxicology expert from the Motherisk Laboratory at Toronto’s
Hospital for Sick Children, Dr. Gideon Koren. Dr. Koren and the
Laboratory were frequented retained by child protection agencies,
and occasionally by the police, to test hair for possible drug or
alcohol use. The expert testified based on analysis of the child’s hair
that the infant had ingested cocaine over a lengthy period. At trial,
the Crown’s expert had been the only expert to testify. After being
convicted and imprisoned, the mother obtained assistance for an
appeal from the relatively well-resourced Association in Defence of
the Wrongly Convicted.121 In overturning the conviction, the Court
of Appeal noted, “[a] live controversy at trial was whether the victim
exhibited any behavioural signs consistent with chronic exposure to
significant amounts of cocaine.” 122 However, the mother, due to lack
of resources, had no expert at the criminal trial, a trial by judge
alone, to challenge the opinions expressed by the Crown’s expert,
and his evidence “remained unshaken” in cross-examination at trial.
In reversing the conviction, the Court of Appeal found, as a result of
fresh expert evidence adduced by the defence and admitted on
appeal, that “the trial judge made her decision unaware of the
119
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genuine controversy among the experts about the use of the testing
methods relied upon by the Crown expert at trial to found a
conclusion of chronic cocaine ingestion.”123
A number of child protection agencies in Ontario and other
provinces used the Motherisk hair analysis test results for
investigative and case planning purposes. After the Court of Appeal
decision in Broomfield, the Attorney General of Ontario appointed
the Honourable Susan Lang to undertake a review to assess the
adequacy and reliability of hair analysis evidence used in child
protection and criminal proceedings.124 Justice Lang reported in
December 2015 that the hair-testing process used was “inadequate
and unreliable” and the use of evidence from the lab “had serious
implications for the fairness of child protection and criminal
cases.”125 The Hospital for Sick Children closed the Motherisk
Laboratory in April 2015.126
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The Court of Appeal decision in Broomfield and the Lang
Review did not directly address the issue of whether the testimony of
staff from the Laboratory was insufficiently reliable as “novel
science” to even be admitted, or merely insufficiently reliable to be
given much weight. However, arguably, if the limitations of this
evidence were known by the courts, it should not even have been
admissible.
Issues related to use of Motherisk hair analysis serve as
important reminders of the challenges inherent in the admission of
and reliance on expert evidence. This paper does not directly
consider the many complex issues that arise from the Motherisk
cases and the Lang Review, except to argue that concerns related to
expert evidence in child protection cases raise issues under the
Charter of Rights.127 The Canadian courts have accepted that there
are cases where s.7 of the Charter and the “principles of
fundamental justice” require a court to order that the state provide
counsel for parents in child protection cases without resources, so
there may be a fair trial process.128 It is also clear that there are
families where children taken, first phase of review finds,” Toronto Star
(28 October 2016), online: <www.thestar.com>.
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Rachel Mendleson, “Sick Kids shuts down hair tests at Motherisk lab”, The
Star (17 April 2015), online: <www.thestar.com>.
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For a fuller discussion of the basis for a Charter order for government
funding of an expert, see Nicholas Bala & Jane Thomson, “Motherisk and
Charter Orders for Experts for Parents in Child Welfare Cases” (2016) 35:2
Can Fam LQ 199.
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New Brunswick v G (J), [1999] 3 SCR 46, [1999] SCJ No 47; and R v
Rowbotham, 1988 CarswellOnt 58, [1988] O.J. No. 271. In a criminal case,
it is common for the court to order a stay unless the accused has counsel,
while in child protection cases this is not an appropriate remedy and courts
will directly order representation for indigent parents.
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cases, like Broomfield, where state-funded experts called by the
Crown or a child protection agency are providing critical, and
sometimes novel, scientific evidence. These are cases where, without
appropriate challenging of a state-retained expert by an expert
retained by the parents, the process may not accord with the
principles of fundamental justice and may result in a miscarriage of
justice. We argue that, in appropriate cases, the court may make an
order for funding an expert for indigent parents under the Charter of
Rights s. 7. This argument is especially strong in cases that involve
medical or hard science evidence, which counsel and judges
typically have greater difficulty in understanding and challenging
compared to social science based testimony.
While there is no Canadian jurisprudence that directly deals with
this issue, American case law establishes that, in appropriate cases
involving termination of parental rights, the constitutional right to
due process and a fair trial requires that the court order the state to
pay to allow parents to retain an expert to consult with counsel and
prepare a report to challenge an expert retained by a child protection
agency.129 These arguments should also be persuasive in Canada,
where vital liberty and security of the person interests of parents and
children are at stake in child protection proceedings, and the
principles of fundamental justice may require that parents have
access to their own experts to challenge expert evidence proffered by
the government.

129

See In Re Egbert Children, 651 NE (2d) 38 (Ohio Ct App, 1994). In Ake v
Oklahoma, 470 US 68 (1985) where the Supreme Court of the United
States held that an indigent criminal defendant had the constitutional right
to have the state provide a psychiatric evaluation to be used in this defense.
See also Paul Giannelli, “Ake v Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance
in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World” (2004) 89 Cornell L Rev 1305.
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CONCLUSION: ADDRESSING CHALLENGES IN USE OF
EXPERT EVIDENCE
It is essential for lawyers, judges, and other professionals involved in
the justice system to understand the role of expert evidence in childrelated cases. Experts, in particular mental health professionals, have
a critical role in assisting courts, lawyers, and parents in making
decisions about children and their parents. Experts in child-related
cases, however, must have appropriate education and be familiar
with evolving research. Their reports should always identify their
role (court-appointed or party-retained), the procedures that they
have adopted, and the limitations of their work. While mental health
professionals may have important evidence for a child-related case,
it is also vital for lawyers, judges, and mental health professionals to
be aware of the limitations and challenges accompanying the use of
such evidence.
Court-ordered assessments undertaken by qualified, independent
professionals using accepted methodologies and standards can assist
courts in making the most appropriate decisions about children, and
these assessments can also play a significant role in facilitating
settlements,130 an especially important concern in child-related cases.
There are legislative provisions or rules of court in each
province that permit assessments to be ordered by a court in child130

See e.g., Nicholas Bala & Alan Leschied, “Court-Ordered Assessments In
Ontario Child Welfare Cases: Review And Recommendations For Reform”
(2008), 24 Can J Fam L 1, which presents data on a study of Ontario
lawyers and judges who reported that an independent court-ordered
assessment in a child protection case often results in a settlement of a case.
See also comments of Mackinnon J in Hayes v Goodfellow, 2011 ONSC
3362, [2011] WDFL 4395 at para 6: “Experience also shows that the
prospect of settlement is significantly enhanced by the availability of an
assessment report. With it, the entire trial may have proven unnecessary.”
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related cases, and there is guidance in the standards of some
professional organizations about how assessments are to be
undertaken. However, there is an absence in Canada of government
regulation and accreditation of those who undertake this most
important work. Although many who undertake assessments are well
trained, appropriately educated, and skilled, some are not. Some who
prepare these reports are members of regulated professions and
subject to some type of government-mandated regulation, while
others who do these assessments are not members of regulated
professions;131 further, even for those who are members of regulated
professions, the regulation is not focused on this type of forensic
work.
Although the scope of their evidence and opinions should not be
as broad as the testimony of court-appointed experts, professionals
retained and called as a witness by one party can also have an
important role in the resolution of child-related disputes. One of the
contentious issues raised by the Ontario Court of Appeal decision M.
v. F.132 is the involvement a party-retained expert in a child-related
case providing a review of the report of a court-appointed assessor.
While there are professional standards for assessments by mental
health professionals in child-related cases, there is a lack of clear
professional standards about how to undertake and testify about a
forensic review.133 A growing body of literature provides helpful
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In Ontario, the College of Psychologists (2014) Task Force released an
informational set of guidelines for those members who perform child
custody and parenting capacity assessments. The document specifically
refers to a mental health professional who provides consultation for court
purposes and critiquing an assessor’s work, though it does not provide
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guidance for mental health professionals retained by one party’s
lawyer in a child-related case,134 but professional organizations
should address in a more systematic way the ethical and other issues
that arise when undertaking a review for forensic purposes. It is
important for professionals to be reminded about and accountable
for maintaining objectivity and independence, especially when
retained for a forensic review of a colleague’s work. There are also
practical issues that need to be addressed about the admission of
such critique evidence: for example, when and how the reviewer
should be given access to notes and data used by the original
assessor to allow for a complete review; and when the reviewer
should be allowed (or required) to discuss the case with the original
assessor.
A lawyer in a child-related case may also retain a mental health
professional to provide assistance in preparing a client for an
assessment or to assist the lawyer in understanding an assessment
report and cross-examining the assessor. As with other roles
concerning child-related assessments, in Canada at present there is a
lack of professional guidance about this “litigation consultant” role
for mental health professionals;135 can, for example, a professional

much detail on this topic. See the College of Psychologists of Ontario, “Enews Bulletin”, (2015) 6:2, online: <http://www.cpo.on.ca/Resources>.
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who has been a litigation consultant maintain sufficient objectivity
to also be an expert witness?
As with many other issues related to the family justice system,
some of the most pressing challenges concerning experts relate to a
lack of resources and inadequate access to the services of qualified
mental health professionals for this type of work. Lack of training,
education, and support has resulted in too few professionals who can
do this type of work, and often significant delays in getting access to
those who do it; the delay in obtaining an assessment may cause
delay in the resolution of cases about children, who experience
added stress as their cases are prolonged. While some parents, like
those in M. v. F., can afford to retain these professionals, many
cannot. In some jurisdictions there is some access to government
funded or subsidized services, but in many places in Canada there
are lengthy delays in obtaining these services, and in too many
places they are unavailable. As discussed in this paper, there may be
situations in child welfare cases where claims can be made under the
Charter to require the provision of expert assistance to parents, but
in most situations, these critical resource questions are matters of
political will and wisdom. It is hoped that those responsible for the
justice system will recognize the importance of mental health
professionals for making sound decisions about children, and devote
sufficient resources to allow this to occur.

